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Abstract
Availability of a complex system of thermal power plant is strongly influenced by maintenance program and component reliability.
Various maintenance techniques, likes RCM (reliability-centred maintenance), RBM (risk based maintenance) and CBM (condition-based
maintenance), have been applied to improve the availability. Implementation of RCM, RBM, CBM alone or combined RCM and RBM or
RCM and CBM is a maintenance technique used in thermal power plants. This study develops an new maintenance methodology
integrating RCM, RBM and CBM to increase the availability of thermal plants. The method generates MPI (Priority Maintenance Index)
and FDT (Failure Defense Task). MPI is used to determine the priority of components in maintenance program. FDT consists of the tasks
of monitoring and assessment of conditions other than maintenance tasks. Both MPI and FDT obtained from development of functional
tree, failure mode effects analysis, fault-tree analysis, and risk analysis (risk assessment and risk evaluation) were then used to develop and
implement a plan and schedule maintenance, monitoring and assessment of the condition and ultimately perform availability analysis. The
results of this study indicate that the reliability, risks and conditions-based maintenance methods, in an integrated manner can increase the
availability of thermal power plant.
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1. Introduction
A complex system with high production loss value, such
as a power plant, keeping availability and reducing costs
related to maintenance are at the top of management
concerns in a large enterprise. The system availability is
determined the component reliability and the maintenance
program implemented. That program influences the repair
time and the reliability of component and system.
Normally, a system’s reliability will deteriorate and this
increases the probability of failure. Further, the availability
of the system will decrease. In case of the power plant, the
unavailability occurred results a high cost of production
loss depend on the time duration of shutdown condition.
Availability measures are related to how long time the
unit can operate in the certainty period time. Most power
plants use the index proposed by IEEE std.762tm (2006) to
define availability [1]. That index represents the percentage
of a given period of time, expressed in hours that the unit is
in service (including reserve shutdown state). Reference [2]
defined expressed by the ratio of the mean time to failure to
the sum of the mean time to failure plus the mean time to
repair. The index, usually evaluated monthly, is reported in
a Generating Availability Data System (GADS) and can be
used for comparison between different generating systems.
A reduction in availability is caused by planned
maintenance and unplanned maintenance actions. Improper
maintenance can result a repair time longer than that based
on manufacturer’s recommendation or the system reliability
decreases. For keeping the system availability, a proper
maintenance program is needed.
In a complex system, there are several maintenance
problems i.e. how to identify critical components, how to
priority and how to maintain them. Maintenance techniques
developed in the literature propose various rules to category
the system components into critical component. Then, they
determine the priority maintenance and finally plan a
maintenance program which consists of preventive
maintenance and condition monitoring tasks.
Various maintenance techniques have been proposed to
increase an availability of any systems [3]. Generally, the
established maintenance techniques have been developed in
the literature i.e. Reliability Centred Maintenance (RCM),
Risk Based Maintenance (RBM) and Condition Based
Maintenance (CBM).
The development and applying of RCM, RBM and
CBM can be found in [4]-[10], [11]-[15] and [16]-[19]
respectively. Several researchers have been integrated two
of those maintenance techniques in one maintenance
program. Integration between RCM and CBM, RCM and
RBM has been done in [20] and [21], respectively. This
integration increases the availability higher than that each
the techniques is implemented separately. In the present,
the study of integration of those techniques has been not
developed. Integration all techniques are expected to yield
the increasing of availability higher than that resulted of
integration between RCM – RBM or RCM – CBM.
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Nomenclature
t = time period [h]
R(t) = reliability at time t
M(t) = reliability at time t
β = Weibull distribution shape parameter
η = Weibull distribution characteristic life [h]
μ = Mean in the logarithmic domain, lognormal distribution
σ = Standard deviation in the logarithmic domain lognormal
distribution
AF = Availability Factor
EAF = Equivalent Availability Factor
MTTF = Mean Time to Failure
MTTR = Mean Time to Repair
RPN = Risk priority number
S = Severity
O = Occurrence
D = Detection
MC = Maintenance Cost
RI = Risk Index
Cf = Fixed cost of failure (cost of spare parts)
DT = Down Time
Cv = Variable cost per hour of down time
PLC = Production Loss Cost
PL = Production loss in Mega Watt hour
SP = Selling price of generated electricity
FDT = Failure Defense Task
MPI = Maintenance Prioritization Index
POH = Sum of all hours experienced during Planned Outage
(PO) + Planed outage Extension (PE) of any Planned
Outage (PO)
MOH = Sum of all hours experienced during Maintenance
Outage (MO) + Maintenance Outage Extension of any
Maintenance Outage (MO)
SH = Service hours, Sum of all Unit Service Hours
PH = Periods hours, Number of hours in the period being
reported that the unit was in the active state.
AH = Availability hours, Sum of all Service Hours (SH) +
Reserve Shutdown Hours (RSH) + Pumping Hours +
Synchronous Condensing Hours.
EFDH = Each individual Forced Derating (D1, D2, D3) is
transformed into equivalent full outage hour(s). This is
calculated by multiplying the actual duration of the
derating (hours) by the size of the reduction (MW) and
dividing by the Net Maximum Capacity (NMC), these
equivalent hour(s)are then summed
ESDH = Equivalent Scheduled Derated Hours, Each individual
Planned derating (PD,DP) and Maintenance Derating
(D4, DM) is transformed into equivalent full outage
hour(s). This calculated by multiplying the actual
duration of the derating (hours) by the size of reduction
(MW) and dividing by the Net Maximum Capacity
(NMC). These equivalent hour(s) are then summed.
This paper presents a new methodological maintenance
development to yield an integrated maintenance program.
In this method, a new approach to identify the most critical
components in a thermal power plant by combining the
concepts of RCM, RBM and CBM. The criticality is
associated with the component reliability and the risk of its
failure. The higher the criticality of the component, the
more technical and financial resources should be expended
in the maintenance activities to keep the thermal power
plant availability for operation. The method results a FDT
aiming at the overall thermal power plants availability.
FDT is defined as maintenance activities including
preventive maintenance and condition monitoring tasks.
This paper is structured in the following way: Section 1
provides a background of the methodological maintenance
development. The steps of the methodological maintenance
development are explained in Section 2. Selected example
of application to thermal power plant is discussed in
Section 3. Conclusions are then discussed in the last
section.
2. Development Method
The first step is the elaboration of a thermal power plant
functional tree that describes the functional relationship
between the subsystems of equipment to the relationship
between – components. The structure of the system is
described in the function tree from top to bottom. The top
level describes the main function of system analysed. The
bottom level describes the components of the system.
Between of them there are several equipment. All the
components forming the function of the level above and
subsequently formed the main functions of the system.
Event of components will affect the above system-level
events and subsequent events on top system. This
functional tree will be the basis for further process analysis
on the method developed.
The next stage is to perform FMEA analysis for each
component mentioned in the function tree. Each component
analysed is based on modes of damage and the effects of
the system. FMEA can be seen from the analysis of the
most critical components. This analysis is to identify the
level of criticality of each component and then determined
the sequence of critical levels of all components. The
critical level is determined severity, occurrence, and
detection. The order of criticality based FMEA analysis
denoted with ranking priority number (RPN) which is
multiplication of severity (S), occurrence (O) and detection
(D).
The level of criticality of each index is denoted by
numerical code of the value of 1 to 10. A value of 1
indicates the lowest critical level and the value of 10
indicates the highest level of criticality. Range 1 to 10
illustrates the qualitative scale defined through expert panel
and [22] on this study. Expert panel consists of experienced
technicians, engineers and planners in maintenance
activities the thermal power plant.
Based on the severity, component failure causing
unavailability of the system is categorized as critical
components. This unavailability caused by the activities of
the component repair failed. The longer time to repair
means that the higher the level of criticality of the
component. The severity values that categorized critical
components begin grades 6. The description of the severity
of the value of 6 to 10 is given in Table 1.
The occurrence includes criteria for determining the
criticality of components. Components with the emergence
of failure in a short time mean lower component reliability.
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Table 1
Critical severity index of the thermal power plant
Critical
Index Description
(6)
Major
The potential component failure causes the failure of
equipment , but does not cause damage to other
components but the equipment is still available, the
failure resulted trip equipment, potential damage to
the environment, failure potentially not meet
government regulations regarding environmental,
failure lead to or replacement of components which
fail, failure resulting plan trips , and can be recovered
in less than 2 days, ability ramp rate down to 45 %,
impact decrease in efficiency increase 15 %, failure
of the parent system functions in one ( 8 hours ) or
100 % redundancy
(7)
Severe
Potential failure hardware components cause but no
damage other components, potential severe damage
to the environment, failure to comply with the
government resulted in no, the failure resulted in the
repair or replacement of components failed ,plant /
equipment not be operated hearts Short Time ( 2-7
days ),ability street level down- up to 55 %, impact
efficiency 18 % reduction
failure parent system function hearts 4 hours
redundancy or 50 %
(8)
Very Severe
The potential component failure causes the failure of
equipment , but does no cause damage to other
components, the failure resulted trip equipment,
inflicting severe damage to the environment, failure
result does not meet government regulations, the
failure resulted in the repair or replacement of
components which fail, plant / equipment cannot be
operated in a long time (7 days -1 month), ability
ramp rate down to 65 %, impact decrease in
efficiency of 21%, failure of the parent system
functions in 1 hour or redundancy of 50 %
(9)
Hazardous
Failure cause severe damage to the components or
other equipment, equipment failures result trip, cause
harm to the environment , hazardous material leaks
into the environment, failure result does not meet
government regulations, the failure resulted in the
repair or replacement of many components, plant /
equipment cannot be operated in a long time ( 1-3
months ), ability ramp rate down to 75 %, impact
reduction efficiency of 25 %,system malfunction
within 30 minutes or no back up
(10)
Catastrophic
Failure cause severe damage to other equipment, the
failure resulted trip a system equipment, cause harm
to the environment , hazardous material leaks into the
environment, failure result does not meet government
regulations, the failure resulted in the replacement of
almost all components, plant / equipment cannot be
operated in a long time ( > 3 months ), ability ramp
rate of up to > 75 %, system failures have a major
impact on reducing the efficiency , failure of the
parent function immediately or no back-up
Unavailability is often caused by low reliability of
components and should be avoided. The higher rate of
occurrence means that the lower the reliability of
components and it also means that the higher the degree of
criticality. Criticality components based occurrence index
determined by the maintenance cycle. In the case of this
study, the major inspection & overhaul (MI) is done every
four years. Component failure that occurred prior to the MI
is categorized critical component. This means that failure
has occurred prior to the preventive maintenance. Category
critical component starts from the value 6 in which the
failure can occur before four years or the preventive
maintenance performed. The description occurrence index
of the value of 6 to 10 is given in Table 2.
Table 2
Critical occurrence index of the thermal power plant
Critical
index Description
6 Failure occurred under 4 years
7 Failure occurred under 2 years
8 Failure occurred under 1 years
9 Failure occurred under 6 months
10 Failure occurred under 3 months
In general, the criticality of components defined the
possibility of failure occurring during the system operation.
For mechanical-electrical system component damage is not
sudden. Failure was preceded by a decrease in reliability
and this can be monitored. Components that failure cannot
be monitored with existing technology categorized critical
components. Level of the monitoring capabilities the failure
of component denoted by detection index. Components are
most easily detectable failure given index value 1. Index
value 10 for components failure cannot be detected with
existing technology. In the case of thermal power plant, the
component failures can be detected. This means there is no
critical component categories based on detection. All the
components can be controlled to avoid a failure during the
system operation.
FMEA analysis produces a sequence component
criticality. Then the next step is to develop a failure
diagnostic procedure that allows rapid recovery actions in
case of failure occurrence. That procedure determines the
root cause of the component failure aiming at directing
technicians to investigate the cause of the detected failure.
We use Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) technique for
diagnosing a failure. This technique is suitable for tracing
the cause of failure to a complex system with many
components [23]. Search the cause of the failure is done by
decomposing the groove cause the failure from system to
the subsystems to component level. Thus, using FTA in the
developed method can improve maintainability by speed-up
failure diagnosis.
FTA generates a series of maintenance actions that
include preventive maintenance task and condition &
assessment task. A set of maintenance actions aimed at
avoiding the unexpected failures and is called Failure
Defence Task (FDT) in this study. This FDT also FDT term
commonly is used in the practice of maintenance of the
case study. FDT can be either repair or replacement
actions. The repair action restores the component like a
new condition as replacement actions.
Determination of the critical level components in the
FMEA analysis has not considered the aspect of risk
associated with the costs of the failure. Risk will need to be
considered because the cost is an important factor in
managing a thermal power plant. Risk of component
damage caused substantial costs should be prioritized in
maintenance. This study considers the risk in determining
the criticality of components through risk analysis.
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There are two steps in the analysis of risk i.e. the risk
assessment and evaluation. At this step of the risk
assessment were calculated probability of occurrence of
failure and its consequences. That probability is obtained
through the use of software Weibull++ (Reliasoft, 2003).
The consequence is calculated from the cost of repair
required and the cost of lost production.
The calculation of the cost of repair using Eq. (1) in
[14],
vf CDTCMC . (1)
And the calculation of the cost of lost production using Eq.
(2) in [14],
SPPLDTPLC .. (2)
The second step is to calculate the risk evaluation. This
evaluation result the risk index which is obtained from
dividing the value of risk assessment to the level of
acceptable risk in [23]. The component criticality is
determined by the value of the risk index. In this study, the
critical component is a component that has a risk index
above 0.8. Conversely, components that have a risk index
of less than 0.8 are not considered critical components.
Thus the critical level is not only determined by the
reliability aspects but involves aspects of risk.
Two important aspects of maintenance have been
considered to determine the criticality of components,
namely reliability and risk. The next step is to set
maintenance priority based on those aspects. Weighted
RPN is extended the deﬁnition of RPN by multiplying it 
with a weight parameter, which characterize the importance
of the failure causes within the system [24]. In the same
manner, we use to calculated Maintenance Priority Index
(MPI) which to determine the maintenance priority of
components. The higher value of MPI means higher
priority component in the maintenance.
The maintenance priority is indicated by the value of
MPI that obtained by using Eq. (3).
RIxRPNMPI  (3)
MPI value becomes an important element in preparing
the maintenance program. Component with the highest MPI
value is a top priority in the maintenance. The MPI value
also used to determine condition monitoring & assessment
plan. Condition monitoring is most required for groups of
components that have a high value of MPI. Maintenance
action based on condition monitoring is necessary to
maintain the component with a high level of criticality is
not fail during the system operation. Such components
failure reduces the availability significantly and produces
great risk costs.
The combination of MPI, FDT and condition
monitoring shows three important aspects of the
maintenance has been integrated in setting up a
maintenance program that is called the integrated
maintenance program. This program includes the type of
periodic preventive maintenance actions, determination the
type of condition monitoring (on-line or off–line) and
maintenance intervals. Determining the type of
maintenance actions are based on the FDT of each
component that has been formulated at the FTA analysis.
The integrated maintenance program is formed to
improve the availability of power plant. Three aspects are
important in the maintenance of the reliability, risks and
conditions have been adopted in this maintenance program.
Each of these aspects has been used in the RCM, RBM and
CBM. The development of this program has been to
integrate two maintenance bases, namely time and
condition-based maintenance.
The final step of the methodology is the analysis of
reliability and availability. This analysis is done to see the
effect of the implementation of an integrated maintenance
program to improve the availability of the system. The
reliability analysis is based on the time to failure data
analysis. Meanwhile, the availability analysis is based on
the analysis of the repair time. The effectiveness of the
maintenance methodology can be measured from the extent
to which the increased availability after application of the
integrated maintenance program.
The main steps of the methodology of maintenance
proposed are shown as Fig. 1.
Fig.1. The main steps of the methodological of maintenance developed
In the methodology, the integrated maintenance
program is formed of four input factors, namely the data
history of operation and maintenance, FDT, MPI and
condition monitoring. The mechanism of the formation of
the integrated maintenance program from four input factors
is given as Fig. 2.
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Fig. 2. Flow chart of the integrated maintenance program
3. Application
The method has been developed is applied to the
thermal power plant Unit 4 with an output capacity of 200
MW, located in North-Jakarta. They have 1664 kinds of
mechanical and electrical components. The reliability and
availability of the thermal power plant are simulated based
on a three-year failure database.
3.1. Functional tree
The functional tree the power plant is presented in Fig.
3 and was divided into thirteen subsystems. For detail of
the functional tree of the system which is divided into
subsystems until each component, each one performing a
specific function in connection with the subsystem main
functions. A failure in a component at the bottom of the
tree affects all subsystems above it, causing a possible
degradation in the thermal power plant operation,
represented by any reduction in the nominal power output
or even environmental degradation. The tree was according
developed according to the operation manual furnished by
the manufacturer.
3.2. Failure mode and effect analysis
The FMEA analysis was performed for each component
listed in the end of a given branch of the functional tree.
The failure modes for the components were developed
according to manufacturer’s information’s and other failure
analysis from FMEA team. The FMEA team identifies,
evaluates, and prioritizes potential failures [25].
The analysis pointed out that the most critical
components for the thermal power plant are:
1. Cooling water system: Shaft of main circulating water
pump.
2. Feed water system: thrust bearing of BFP variable speed
hydraulic coupling, journal bearing of scoop tube assy,
Mechanical seal of BFP#A, shaft of scoop tube assy,
primary shaft of variable speed hydraulic coupling.
3. Boiler system: Platen super heater inlet header,
Finishing superheater inlet header, Primary superheater
tube, Primary superheater inlet header, Finishing
superheater element, Primary reheater element,
Finishing reheater element, Primary reheater inlet
header, Boiler pressurized second superheater.
4. Turbine system: Thrust pad passive side, Thrust pad
active side, Turbine journal bearing, Journal bearing
tilting pad, Low Pressure rotor blade, Main stop valve
stem, High pressure rotor blades.
5. Generator system: Rotor copper conductor, Winding
copper, Stator winding insulation.
a
Fig. 3. The functional tree of Thermal power plant Unit 4
3.3. Fault tree analysis
The functional tree is fundamental for the understanding
of the functional relation between system components. At
the subsystem system level, the fault tree of thermal power
plant is showed in Fig. 4. This fault tree can be elaborated
including lower subsystem until their components at the
bottom level. The events at component level are named a
basic event. These events are analyzed to plan a
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maintenance program. Based on the functional tree, we use
the fault-tree technique to identify the component failure of
combination of component failures that cause the failure of
system or subsystem. For those components a maintenance
program can be formulated to avoid their failures. The
maintenance program consists of preventive maintenance
and condition-monitoring tasks. In the present study, those
tasks is named failure defense task (FDT).
3.4. Failure defense task
The maintenance program of thermal power plant is
based on four or five year cycles depending on system
condition. Some annually based basic preventive tasks are
performed. In the middle of the cycle a more complex
inspection is performed. After that the basic tasks are
performed annually and at the end cycle major inspection
and overhaul maintenance is performed.
Based on the results of the FMEA and Risk analysis, the
RCM and RBM concepts can be used to recommend FDT
to those components that have a criticality index greater
than 6 (severity) and/or 6 (occurrence) and/or 0.8 (risk
index). The failure of those components can cause the
unavailability of the thermal power plant. In the present
study the detectable index do not used as critical index
because all the component failures can be detected by
technology available.
Generally, the power plant has a complex monitoring
system based on temperature, pressure, vibration, chemical
concentrates, acoustic, gas, current measurements and
analysers. That system is used to monitor and assess the
real-time condition of the critical components of the
thermal power plant allowing the use of FDT to improve
the system availability. Those data can be used to define
the trend and pattern in the equipment condition and a limit
value must be selected as a potential failure indicator.
That value allows identification of the alert level,
providing to schedule FDT before failure occurs. The
analysis is used for the implementation of the FDT.
Moreover, most of the critical components of the thermal
power plant can be assisted with FDT.
3.5. Risk analysis
Risk analysis is done to identify the level of risk arising
from a component failure to the system. There are two
consequences of the costs incurred as a result of failure of
the components i.e. the maintenance cost and production
loss cost. Those costs are calculated respectively using Eq.
(1) and (2). In the case of thermal power plant Unit 4, PLC
calculation per hour is around US$ 11,840. Results
calculated from both equations for each component are
added.
Then, the total of those costs is divided by the value of
acceptable risk to obtain risk index. The acceptable risk
was determined based on yearly maintenance expenditure
Unit 4 (US$ 2,080,000).
Fig. 4. The fault tree of the thermal power plant
3.6. Maintenance Priority Index
MPI value calculation applied to all components of the
bottom of the tree function. This value is obtained from the
calculation by using Eq. (3). Once identified based on the
criticality index, from 1664 components in the system there
are 858 types of critical components. This criticality is
based on one of the index value of the index the severity,
occurrence and risk. In this paper all critical components
are not shown. The highest value is on the blade of the
turbine system components. This component is certainly
not suffered failure during system operation. Therefore, the
components which have high MPI values should get
priority maintenance. Maintenance priorities presented
within the scope of activities of the FDT.
3.7. Reliability and Availability Analysis
Reliability can be defined as the probability that a
system the probability that a system will perform properly
for a specified period of time under a given set of operating
conditions. For the thermal power plant the failure is any
component failure that causes incapacity of generating the
nominal power output.
The reliability analysis is performed on the power plant.
It is based on the time to failure data analysis. Probably the
single most used parameter to characterize reliability is the
MTTF. It is just the expected or mean value of the failure
time, expressed as in Eq. (4):



0
)( dttRMTTF (4)
Thermal power plant
Failure
FEED WATER
SYSTEM Failure
06
CONDENSATE
WATER SYSTEM
Failure
05
FUEL OIL
SYSTEM Failure
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GAS FUEL
SYSTEM Failure
03
BOILER Failurel
08
MONITORING
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COOLING WATER
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02
TURBINE ailure
09
TRANSFORMATOR
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11
GENERATOR
PLANT Failure
10
PLANT
CONTROL
SYSTEM Fails
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AIR AND FLUE
GAS SYSTEM
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07
ELECTRICAL
INSTALLATION
Failure
13
FUEL SYSTEM
Failure Equipment Failure
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Random failures constitute the most widely used model
for describing reliability phenomena. They are defined by
the assumption that the rate of failure of a system is
independent of its age and other characteristics of its
operating history. The Weibull probability distribution is
one of the most widely used distributions in reliability
calculations involving time related failures. Through the
appropriate choice of parameters a variety of failure rate
behaviours can be modelled, including constant failure rate,
in addition to failure rates modelling both wear-in and
wear-out phenomena.
The thermal power plant is modelled as one block. For
that block the reliability and maintainability distribution are
estimated based on failure data recorded. The two-
parameter Weibull distribution, typically used to model
wear-out that failure rate increases. This distribution
represented in Eq. (5):












t
etR )( (5)
The distribution parameters are estimated through the
use of parametric estimation methods that fit the
distribution to the ‘time to failure’ data. There are
procedures for estimating the Weibull distribution
parameters from data, using what is known as the
maximum likelihood estimation method. For the thermal
power plant reliability analysis the software Weibull ++
version 6 (Reliasoft,2003 ) was used for parameter
estimation.
The results of parameter values estimation for the
thermal power plant are 3533,5 and 15211 . The
thermal power plant presented 39 failures that caused
equipment unavailability in the analysis period. Several of
those 22 failures occurred in the first two operational years.
Most of them were related to leakage in line drain gland
turbine and economizer. In the last three years there were 1
leakage in line drain gland and 2 leakages in glad seal
steam. The failure root-cause was improperly monitoring
feed water, pressure and temperature.
The failures that may affect thermal power plant
availability were associated with components listed at the
bottom of functional tree branches presented in Fig. 2 and
were considered as critical components in the FMEA
analysis.
The other aspect from reliability related to increasing
availability is maintainability that is defined the probability
of an equipment will be repaired in a given period of time.
Typically, the describing of the probability distribution was
used lognormal distribution to model the time to repair
distribution of complex systems. The maintainability can be
expressed according to Eq. (6) in [21]:





 


ttM ln)( (6)
Based on the time to repair database for the thermal
power plant using the software Weibull ++ Version 6
(Reliasoft, 2003). The lognormal distribution parameters
for maintainability modelling are 9652.7 and
9333.0 .
The thermal power plant is an electrical-mechanical
complex system. It means there are two categories of the
component, i.e. electrical and mechanical component. In
mechanical component, the causes of failure are likely to be
quite obvious. The primary time entailed in the repair is
then determined by how much time is required to extract
the damage parts and install the new component. In
contrast, If an electronic device fails, maintenance
personnel may spend most of the repair procedure time in
diagnosing the problem, for it may take considerable effort
to understand the nature of the failure well enough to locate
the part that is the cause. Conversely, it may be a rather
straightforward procedure to replace the faulty component
once it has been located.
Once the reliability and maintainability parameters are
calculated the system availability can be estimated. The
availability is controlled by two parameters. Firstly, MTTF
which is a measure of how long, on average, the thermal
power plant will perform as specified before an unplanned
failure will occur, being associated with equipment
reliability. Secondly, MTTR which is a measure of how
long, on average, it will take to bring the equipment back to
normal serviceability when it does fail. Although reliability
can be at least estimated during the thermal power plant
design stages, its availability is strongly influenced by the
uncertainties in the repair time. Those uncertainties are
influenced by many factors such as the ability to diagnose
the cause of failure or the availability of equipment and
skilled personnel to carry out the repair procedures. In the
case of a thermal power plant, the same equipment model
can present different availability in different sites due to
difference in the skill of personnel responsible for
maintenance.
Considering the thermal power plant operating one year
or 8760 hours and using parameters of the reliability and
maintainability probability distribution is found the
availability for the thermal power plant given in Table 4.
Availability is an index dependent on reliability and
maintainability. The availability will increase if the
reliability increases and/or the maintainability increase.
In Table 4, the average availability of thermal power
plant within 2008 to 2012 is 76.95 %. The thermal power
plant analysed in the present study has lower availability
than the value presented in the NERC. The availability can
be increased through FDT, These maintenance tasks will
reduce the probability of failure during the thermal power
plant operating.
3.8. Availability Improvement
The maintenance policy performed in the present study is
called FDT that consists of the preventive and predictive
maintenance tasks. FDT is the results of the availability
analysis listed in Table 4. Management can implemented
our recommendation of maintenance improvement to
increasing the thermal power plant availability.
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Implementation of the FDT improves two aspects of the
maintenance performance i.e. reliability and
maintainability. The chance of those performances can be
seen in Fig. 6 and 7.
Fig. 6 shows the graphic of the thermal power plant
reliability in two periods i.e. 2011 to 2012 and 2013 to
2014. The first period describes the condition which
maintenance tasks are not improved yet. The second cycle
describes the condition which maintenance tasks have
implemented the FDT. The comparison of those provided
the reliability improvement after FDT performed. The
Weibull distribution parameter values after the
improvement are 3307.7 and .17721 Fig. 7 shows
the graphic of the one’s maintainability in the same period.
In this graphic, the maintainability after FDT performed
higher than that before FDT performed. Those graphics
show FDT has increased the reliability and maintainability
of the thermal power plant and hence the availability of the
thermal power plant increases which is shown in Table 5.
The lognormal distribution parameter values for
maintainability after improvement are 6239.5 and
1182.2 .
Table 4
The availability before FDT performed
Year
SH POH MOH FOH RSH AH PH EFDH ESDH
EAF
(HOUR)
2008 7056.53 0 1261.62 37.15 428.70 7485.23 8784 397.88 635.04 73.46%
2009 6403.42 1413.80 459.88 455.73 27.17 6430.59 8760 152.99 421.58 66.85%
2010 501.47 1066.00 1155.62 198.62 638.30 6339.77 8760 135.28 184.73 68.72%
2011 1105.03 1416.00 45.50 0 6193.47 7298.50 8760 4.11 0 83.27%
2012 6649.84 0 325.15 335.38 1473.62 8123.46 8784 2.49 0 92.45%
Average 76.95%
Fig.6. The reliability comparison between before and after FDT
Fig. 7. The availability comparison between before and after
Table 5 shows that the average level of availability
achieved 94.59 %. This value is higher than the average
level of availability is achieved before applied FDT. This
increasing can be seen clearly from the FOH which shows
the frequency of occurrence of unexpected failure. The
condition prior to the FDT, the total time of repair due to
damage to the components is 705.53 hours and this value
decreased after FDT be 33.82 hours. This means FDT
applied can reduce unplanned maintenance activities and
further increase the availability of the system.
4. Conclusion
In this paper we proposed a new methodological
maintenance development for a complex system with high
production loss such as thermal power plant with high
capacity output. Such a system, availability will become the
most important factor that will be concerned by top
management. The method developed is used to increase the
system overall availability. This method has considered
maintenance based of reliability, risk and condition in
which these three maintenance basis have not been
considered in an integrated manner. The integration of
these three maintenance basis is expected to increase the
availability of better than previous methods.
The proposed method has a new rule of the determining
critical components based on FMEA, FTA and risk
analysis. Analysis performed yields MPI for action and
maintenance planning, is called FDT. MPI also is used to
prepare the procedure of condition monitoring for critical
components. Integration between FDT and condition
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monitoring yields an integrated maintenance program that
increases the availability of system.
The method developed has been applied to the case of a
thermal power plant with an output capacity of 200MW.
Availability analysis is done to determine the effectiveness
of an integrated maintenance program. Application of this
method follows the maintenance cycle that has been run on
the system in the present. From the comparison of
performance between before and after implementation of
the proposed maintenance program found that the average
availability of the system within a period of two years
increased from 76.95% to 94.59%. Thus, this method can
improve the system performance especially the availability
of the system.
Table 5
The availability after FDT performed
Year
SH POH MOH FOH RSH AH PH EFDH ESDH
EAF
(HOUR)
2013 7323.94 912 24.00 0 500.07 7824.00 8760 0 0 89.32%
2014 6320.52 0 0 9.82 2429.67 8750.18 8760 1.72 0 99.87%
Average 94.59%
Source: The operation and maintenance data of the thermal power plant
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